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The number of software vulnerabilities has been increasing with the growth of Internet-
enabled software provide reference. Security awareness in the requirements engineering 
stage of software development is important in building secure software. Currently, there 
is no way to measure the readiness of security requirements engineering in an 
organization. The objective of this study is to develop a security requirements 
engineering readiness model (SRERM). Its purpose is to provide a model to assess 
security requirements engineering (SRE) readiness levels in organizations. In order to 
achieve this goal, a systematic mapping study was conducted to identify the relevant 
studies in the SRE domain. After analyzing 104 primary studies, 12 security requirements 
categories were identified and utilized to build a SRERM. Case studies were conducted 
into two software development organizations to validate the usability of the SRERM. 
Based on the case studies, the SRERM is applicable and has the ability to identify the 






 يوسف مفتي مزملالكامل: االسم 
 
 نموذج الجاهزية ألمن هندسه المتطلبات  عنوان الرسالة:
 
 هندسة البرمجيات التخصص:
 
 2017ديسمبر :تاريخ الدرجة العلمية
عدد الثغرات االمنية للبرمجيات تتزايد مع تطور البرامج التي تدعم اإلنترنت توفير مرجعيه. إن الوعي األمني في مرحلة 
الجاهزية ألمن هندسه هندسة المتطلبات لتطوير البرمجيات مهم في بناء البرمجيات اآلمنة. حاليا، ال توجد طريقة لقياس 
. الغرض (SRERM)ألمن هندسه المتطلباته الدراسة هو تطوير نموذج الجاهزية والهدف من هذ في منظمة ما. المتطلبات
في المنظمات. من أجل تحقيق هذا الهدف، تم  (SRE)منه هو توفير نموذج لتقييم مستويات الجاهزية ألمن هندسه المتطلبات 
دراسة أولية، تم تحديد  104د تحليل إجراء دراسة منهجية لتحديد الدراسات ذات الصلة في مجال أمن هندسه المتطلبات. وبع
وقد أجريت دراسات حالة في  ألمن هندسه المتطلبات.نموذج جاهزية فئة من المتطلبات األمنيه وتم اإلستفاده منها لبناء  12
. (SRERM)ألمن هندسه المتطلبات لنموذج الجاهزية منظمتين لتطوير البرمجيات للتحقق من صحة قابلية االستخدام 
وإستناداً إلى دراسات الحالة، فنموذج الجاهزية ألمن هندسه المتطلبات قابل للتطبيق ولديه القدرة على تحديد مستويات 







The number of vulnerabilities of software has been increasing with the growth of 
Internet-enabled software [1]. Security awareness in the requirements engineering (RE) 
stage of the software development lifecycle (SDLC) is important in building secure 
software. Currently, security issues gain more attention because of the popularity of 
social networking systems and cloud computing. Due to the increasing number of users 
around the world, both cloud computing and social networking systems have more 
challenges in securing the availability of the system, the integrity of transferred data and 
the confidentiality of information control [2], [3]. 
There are a number of common challenges to building secure software. Flaws, 
bugs, and defects in software are urgent issues and generally demand high attention. 
According to McGraw [4], it is motivated by the connectivity, complexity and 
extensibility of the software. Then, various attacks, such as buffer flows, race conditions 
and incomplete mitigation, could utilize software flaws to disclose access.  
In addition, malware (malicious software) also becomes a challenge to building 
secure software. Stamp [5] lists various types of malware that are harmful to software, 
such as viruses, worms, Trojan Horses, trap doors, rabbits and spyware. Some solutions 
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are available for mitigating malware: signatures, changes, and anomaly detections. For 
example, to filter malware, users are encouraged to install antivirus software for 
desktops, network devices, mail gateways and network gateways [3]. However, these are 
not sufficient because software requirements are commonly changing over time, so 
various existing security mechanisms would not be relevant [2]. Therefore, security 
awareness in RE activity should be encouraged. 
Integrating security awareness into the RE stage of the software development 
lifecycle (SDLC) is an active area of research and needs to be applied to the real-world 
software industry [6]–[8] . This topic is popularly known as security requirements 
engineering (SRE). For instance, capturing SR has been a popular area of research, 
discussed by dozens of researchers for more than two decades [9]–[12]. Recently, it is 
still applied to cloud computing [13] and Internet-of-things (IoT) [14] research. 
In addition, based on Salini and Kanmani’s survey [15], some established 
frameworks can be considered to answer SRE integration challenges, such as SQUARE, 
SREP, Microsoft Trustworthy SDLC, CLASP, Secure Tropos, Charles Haley, McGraw, 
Appvrille and Pourzandi, Gustav Bostrom and Colleagues, Eduardo Fernandez, and 
Gunnar Peterson.  Salini and Kanmani argued each framework has different advantages 
and disadvantages. However, the recommended SRE framework, in their opinion, is 
SQUARE due to its capabilities.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
Each software industry has its own approach to address SRE challenges. For 
example, one could hire a security expert or provide a workshop to train and encourage 
security awareness to the software developers. An organization also could hire a security 
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consultant to audit their SRE activities. Note that these approaches could only be applied 
to large-scale organizations due to the high costs. 
Software technologies, types of vulnerabilities, and innovations in security 
mechanisms are frequently changing [16]. This has brought about a large amount of 
published research discussing SRE in term of techniques, guidelines and frameworks. 
Most publications discuss the techniques to perform SRE, while the rest tend to build an 
SRE framework. However, there is no study yet which provides a technique or tool for 
software organizations to identify their SRE readiness in software development. In other 
words, software organizations might perform SRE without evaluation.  
The anticipated technique or tool should be validated in terms of usability and 
reliability in the real-world software industry. It should be implementable not only in 
large organizations, but also in smaller ones. In addition, to achieve high impact, it has to 
encompass most security requirements. After discovering the problems and challenges 
clearly, objectives can be defined. 
1.3 Objective 
Main objective of this study is developing a readiness model for security 
requirements engineering. This study aims to develop a readiness model that solves the 
problems of SRE, including the challenges, presented in the previous section.  The 
readiness model is expected to have the ability to determine SRE readiness in an 






There are two sub objectives required to support development of readiness model 
for SRE as follow: 
1. To achieve a readiness model with high quality, we need to collect 
comprehensive information related to SRE. This study utilizes a SMAPS 
method [17], [18] to recognize security requirements engineering publications, 
including available techniques, which are readily accessible in the research 
electronic databases. A SMAPS is a powerful technique to discover relevant 
literature on SRE and comprehensively present extensive information. As a 
result, it could minimize missing important issues, various definitions, or 
recent improvements related to SRE. Thereafter, the obtained information 
could be used in constructing the readiness model. 
2. To measure the applicability and usability of the readiness model, we need to 
conduct a case study. A case study in software organizations is required to 
evaluate the security requirements engineering readiness model (SRERM) 
usability [19], [20] . This approach could capture the missing perception 
between the literature and real-world software organizations. One common 
issue is that the suggested solution in published research cannot be 
implemented in the organization. The reason is different thinking about the 
environment and the software policy of the organization. For example, a 
software organization needs a solution which requires reduced cost and time, 
but the existing research requires a high level of effort. Consequently, the 
research recommendation will not be utilized. Therefore, a case study should 




Research will be valuable if it makes a contribution to knowledge. Typically, 
research contributions in the software engineering domain could propose methodology 
improvement, offer a new technique, build a framework, present a survey, or develop a 
model. Three contributions of this study are described below.  
1. Systematic mapping study (SMAPS). This study conducted the SMAPS to gain 
extensive information related to SRE. The obtained result could help 
researchers in determining the current state of SRE and investigate the next 
interesting research. Various types of information resulted from the SMAPS, 
such as which security requirement category was discussed, which framework 
was developed, which digital sources were utilized, and which requirement 
activity was focused on in the publications. In addition, the most active 
researchers in SRE were also presented.  
2. Security requirements engineering readiness model (SRERM). The SRERM 
utilizes the outcomes of the SMAPS, for example, security requirements 
categories, as an important part. To achieve the objectives, an iterative 
construction was performed in the SRERM development. As a result, this 
model has the ability to determine the readiness level of organizations in 
performing SRE. After applying the SRERM in the project, software 
developers are expected to have more security awareness in general, especially 
in SRE activities. It will also show them how to improve their SRE 
performance in future.  
6 
 
3. Case study. This study has conducted a case study to evaluate the usability of 
the SRERM in software organizations. Two organizations have participated to 
evaluate the SRERM based on set criteria, and have provided several 
constructive comments. An introduction to SRERM was essential before 
asking a participant to complete the post-case study questionnaire. Extracting 
and analyzing the outcome of case study was a challenge. As a result, based on 
the case study outcomes, the SRERM in general could be used in real-world 
software organizations.   
1.5 Research Methodology 
The research methodology consists of four following steps: 
Phase 1: Systematic Mapping Study (SMAPS) 
Five research digital sources were selected to obtain relevant studies. A specific 
protocol was defined to ensure the quality of the result. Then, the identification of 
security requirements and their practices were collected through a SMAPS on the SRE 
topic. 
Phase 2: Developing a readiness model 
 The SRERM development was influenced by several published pieces of research 
that have presented a readiness model [19]–[21]. This study utilizes the outcomes of 
SMAPS to develop security requirements components, including specifying relevant 
practices, in constructing the SRERM. The Motorola assessment tool [22] was selected as 




Phase 3: Performing case study  
In this phase, a case study was performed into two software organizations in order 
to evaluate the usability of the SRERM. The two organizations recommended changes, 
criticism, and modifications which were addressed in SRERM. This phase also had a 
modification section of the SRERM to accommodate feedback from respondents. 
Phase 4: Performing evaluation and modification.  
In the final phase, the evaluation of case study was performed to gain some 
feedbacks. The modification of the SRERM was performed based on respondents’ 
suggestion. 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
The content of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the 
background theories to provide a clear understanding of what this is discussed in this 
study, and to avoid confusion. In addition, the relevant literature that underpins this 
research are discussed in chapter 2. Chapter 3 comprehensively explains the research 
methodology applied in this research.  
In chapter 4 the outcomes of the SMAPS are discussed, such as the identified 
security requirements, the digital research sources, and popular SRE techniques in the 
literature. Chapter 5 extensively describes the development of the SRERM. A case study 
is explained in chapter 6, including the result, feedback, and the SRERM modifications. 








This chapter will present definitions of security, requirements engineering, SRE, 
and a readiness model, and will introduce the case study in detail. A number of SRE 
publications will be presented to recognize what researchers have done, and point out 
gaps in the research. 
2.1 Security 
Security has several meanings in the dictionary: things that are done to keep 
something, safe from danger or crime and protection from bad things. This study will 
examine the definition of security in the computer domain, several security standards, and 
various security objects. 
2.1.1 Definition 
In terms of computer and software, security has meant a way of thinking to 
protect the essential assets of the system, such as information, operating system, 
networking and program [3]. Its implementation has three types: defense, detection and 
deterrence. The most effective approach to include security into software development is 
donning a black hat and thinking like a bad guy [1]. However, software organizations 





2.1.2 Security Standards 
There are various security standards which are employed to assist information 
security management. COBIT, ISO 27001 and 27002, NIST and common criteria are the 
most widely discussed security standards in published studies. The reason is that these are 
produced by known organizations and obtain more security practitioners’ attention than 
other types [3]. These security standards will be discussed concisely. 
COBIT (Control Objective for Information and related Technology) is a well-
established framework to support a company in information technology (IT) management 
and IT governance [23]. It was developed by ISACA (Information Systems Audit and 
Control Association). COBIT 5, recent version of COBIT, provides these security 
features: risk, information security and vulnerability management. The other features of 
COBIT are management of changing regulations and business goal management, which 
are clearly separated from the security domain.  
ISO (International Organization for Standardization) 27001 and 27002 are 
frameworks which belong to the ISO 27000 series [24]. They specifically provide 
management services to develop a secure program. ISO 27001 is used for specifying the 
management of information security program, whereas ISO 27002 provides information 
security controls to support ISO 27001 [3]. To implement the ISO 27000 series, some 
steps, like the PDCA (Plan, Do, Check, Adjust) cycle in COBIT, should be executed. In 
short, ISO 27001 is close to the “Plan” concept in COBIT whereas ISO 27002 is close to 
the “Do” concept. 
NIST (The National Institute of Standards and Technology) provides a document 
containing dozens of security practices to support software development in academic 
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organizations, software industry and government management [25]. It was named as the 
800 series, which the point 800-53 specifically describes how to ensure security control 
[3]. It consists of 18 security control categories as listed below. 
1. Access Control 
2. Awareness and Training 
3. Audit and Accountability 
4. Security Assessment and Authorization 
5. Configuration Management 
6. Contingency Planning 
7. Identification and Authentication 
8. Incident Response 
9. Maintenance 
10. Media Protection 
11. Physical and Environmental Protection 
12. Planning 
13. Personnel Security 
14. Risk Assessment 
15. System and Services Acquisition 
16. System and Communication Protection 
17. System and Information Integrity 




Comparing to COBIT and the ISO 27000 series, NIST 800-53 is the only security 
standard which has not been updated since 2011. In contrast, COBIT was recently 
updated in 2017 and the ISO 27000 series was updated in 2016. While COBIT and ISO 
27000 series are commercial products, NIST 800-53 is instead available for public usage. 
When some organizations need full support to implement security guidelines in software 
development, COBIT is more recommended. 
The other popular free security standards are common criteria (ISO/IEC 15408) 
and W3C Security. The former is a security standard product developed by NIST and the 
National Security Agency (NSA) [26]. It focuses on providing security guidelines related 
to the requirements phase in SDLC. Its purpose is to assist organizations in developing 
security requirements to satisfy their needs. The latter security standard is W3C Security 
[27], which is supported by W3C community members. W3C Security provides various 
online web-security discussion groups, such as web authentication working, web 
application security, web payment, web cryptography working, privacy interests, XML 
security, web security interests, and hardware-based secure services groups. The resulting 
documents of each group contain recommended practices based on discussion to enhance 
security standards in the web domain.  
In addition, there are other security standards which could be utilized for assisting 
security implementation, such as British Standard 7799 Part 3, ITIL (ISO/IEC 20000 
series), SANS Security Policy Resource [28] and the security standard offered by 
Stanford University [29]. However, these are unpopular in SRE publications. 
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2.1.3 Security Objects 
This section introduces various security objects in the software development 
lifecycle. These are computer security, network security, data security, physical security, 
and software security. By understanding security objects, every organization will be able 
to recognize the IT security management needs.  
2.1.3.1 Computer Security 
Computer security in this study is not limited only to explain security in the 
computer environment, but also the operating system, fundamental infrastructure, virtual 
machines, cloud computing and mobile devices security. All of these need to be 
discussed due to their function and support affecting the security of software. Failure in 
satisfying computer security will lead to various vulnerabilities. 
Commonly, the kind of server operating systems for deploying software are Unix, 
Windows, and Linux [3], [30]. However, Peter Tsai [30] reported that the most popular 
server operating system in 2016 is Windows Server 2008 at 45.5 per cent. It is followed 
Windows Server 2012 at 23.6 per cent of, Virtual Machine at 17.9 per cent, and Linux at 
11.7 per cent.   
People’s selection of server operating systems vary due to a number of factors: 
the provided administration tools, security support, stability, features, performance, 
hardware requirements, scalability, TCO (cost of production, administration, and 
downtime), and available third-party applications [31]. In addition, some practices are 
required to improve the security of the selected operating system as listed below [3]. 
1. Remove the unnecessary program to minimize attack objects. 
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2. Install the appropriate security software. 
3. Enhance the authentication processes. 
4. Limit the number of administrators with privileges. 
5. Utilize firewalls to protect the services. 
6. Modify the configuration of software settings. 
7. Patch the system in periodically. 
Fundamental infrastructure security, an important part of computer security, 
encompasses various items: email, web server, proxy server, and DNS [3]. Software 
developers need to consider the security of email. They must guard against security 
attacks that utilize email to attach malware, such as a fake document. The recommended 
practices to secure email are enhancing spam control, email protocol and malware 
control.  
The other object of fundamental infrastructure security is the web server, which 
has vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow, directory traversal, script permissions, 
directory browsing, and old default sample web code [3]. The recommended practices are 
utilizing firewalls, antiviruses, secure logs, feedback analyzers, input validation and 
vulnerability scanners. DNS (Domain Name Service) is an object for satisfying 
fundamental infrastructure security, and the latest updated version needs to be installed to 
secure the system from DoS (Denial of Service) [3]. A proxy server, the last object of 
fundamental infrastructure security, needs to be provided to ensure the transferring-data 
process between client and server is protected.  
 Virtual machines (VMs), a famous term in computer security, is software that 
provides people an authority to install various operating systems in one single computer 
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hardware [3]. It works by utilizing a hypervisor to manage all guest operating systems 
(OSs). The best practices for securing an operating system also should be applied to 
VMs. However, some additional security attention is required for VMs such as managing 
the security control of data storage and securing the hypervisor. The detail best practices 
to protect VMs are listed below. 
1. Utilize security standard NIST 800-125, which offers how to design and secure 
VMs. 
2. Protect the hypervisor by installing a firewall and updating the security control 
configuration. Minimizing the number of administration accounts is highly 
recommended. 
3. Protect the guest OSs by utilizing partitioning that will limit access of attack from 
one guest OS to another one. Another practice is by empowering the intrusion 
detection system (IDS) or intrusion prevention systems (IPS). 
4. Protect the virtual storage by improving the configuration of files control. 
5. Protect the virtual network by integrating IDS or IPS to the network 
configurations. 
Cloud computing, a recent popular technology, is considered as a part of 
computer security. There are various services provided by cloud computing: 
infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), software as a service 
(SaaS), utility computing, web services in the cloud, managed service providers (MSP), 
service commerce platforms, and internet integration [3]. The benefits of cloud 
computing are minimizing the cost of building new infrastructure, educating the 
employee, licensing additional software, and improving security. However, since 2009 
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the security challenges of cloud computing services are growing, such as outage, data 
loss, and attacks. For example, Amazon Web Services (AWS), a provider of cloud 
computing services, had an outage problem to their server in 2011, which meant their 
customers could not access the service. 
Two recommended security practices for cloud computing are performing a 
vendor security review and analyzing the risks [3]. Discovered risks in cloud computing 
can be categorized into confidentiality, integrity and availability risks. For confidentiality 
risks, there are data theft, espionage activity, uncontrolled administration authorization, 
storage stability, storage platform attacks, hijacking and misuse of data. Thereafter, 
integrity risks encompass data loss, data tampering, accidental modification, computer 
failure, and phishing. Lastly, availability risks include outage, application failure, backup 
failure, and slowness. 
Mobile device security discusses security in various existing devices such as 
smartphones and tablets [3]. These devices are considered as computers due to the 
existence of an operating system, management of files and data, and application 
management. Similarly, mobile devices have some risks such as file and data theft, Wi-Fi 
hijacking, open hotspot features, hidden Trojan applications and phishing. The 
recommended security practice is utilizing mobile device management (MDM) such as 
controlling the allowed features and applications. 
2.1.3.2 Network Security 
Network security discusses some solutions to secure the connection between 
server and client devices. The existing solutions utilize a virtual private network (VPN), 
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implementing an intrusion detection system (IDS) and an intrusion prevention system 
(IPS), and installing firewalls. However, attention is required for each solution due to 
various challenges. 
A virtual private network (VPN) aims to virtualize the Internet connection 
between a particular server and client by empowering encryption and a traffic isolation 
technique [3]. The benefit of a VPN is allowing a system to mitigate the person in the 
middle and identify the suspected packages. The challenge of a VPN is how to ensure 
remote access is used properly by users. In addition, administrator access is prohibited for 
suspected emails or malware-infected websites.  
Firewalls are utilized to monitor the network activities and block unauthorized 
access of some applications in the network [3]. This includes network address translation 
(NAT) to convert the IP address and records the traffic log. The challenge in 
implementation is when the applications encrypt their traffic, so the firewall is unable to 
determine whether it is allowed or not.  
An intrusion detection system (IDS) and an intrusion prevention system (IPS) are 
techniques to notify people when strange traffic activities occur in the network [3]. 
Commonly, both are deployed after installing the firewall and antivirus. While the basic 
concept of IDS is logging the malicious activity, and alerting the administrator if 
unknown activity occurs, an IPS instead will block it. The management of both an IDS 
and an IPS will be the challenge. 
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2.1.3.3 Physical Security 
Physical security has a number of considerations for enhancing system security 
[3]. As a security object, it encourages people to divide their security attention into 
various assets such as computer, communication, technical, storage, furniture and fixtures 
assets. The recommended practices to enhance physical security are listed below. 
1. Ensure the doors and windows of a building’s assets are locked properly.  
2. Ensure the computer assets are secured by physical lock, and protected by BIOS, 
access to server room is limited, and enable a tracking system. 
3. Ensure the location of the server is not in a disaster and war zone.   
4. Ensure the location satisfies accessibility, lighting, and other required facilities. 
5. Provide a closed-circuit television (CCTV) and alarm for an unexpected case. 
These practices are examples of ways to maintain physical security. Paying 
attention to them will achieve higher-level security in the future. 
2.1.3.4 Data Security 
Data security covers some important topics such as database security, storage 
security, and data encryption. Understanding data security will encourage the awareness 
of information assets. While computer security and network security are the medium, 
data security is the object transferred. Failure to satisfy data security, the benefits of other 
security objects will be lost.  
Storage is hardware which data reside in. There have been numerous 
improvements in storage over the years: floppy disk, compact disc (CD) or digital video 
disc (DVD), flash drive, hard drive, and currently solid-state drive (SSD) [3]. The risk 
18 
 
will occur in the uncontrolled storage. The recommended technique to achieve storage 
security is by utilizing data encryption and access control management. Administrator 
access must be limited properly to avoid further vulnerabilities. 
A database is a system for storing and managing information such as transaction 
records and human identity records [3]. Paying attention to the security of database is 
important to secure secret information. Data encryption is a common technique to store 
sensitive data into a database system. Managing the people who have administrator 
privileges is also mandatory to ensure the security of the database.  Backup and recovery 
are required in order to establish database security. The first challenge of database 
security is how to determine which data will be backed up. When the data backup is 
huge, the technique for recovery also needs consideration. The second challenge is how 
to monitor and ensure the database will survive for longer time. Both challenges require 
more attention to satisfy the security of data as an important asset. 
2.1.3.5 Software Security 
Software security has various definitions in the literature with a similar meaning. 
“Software security is about building secure software: designing software to be secure, 
making sure that software is secure, and educating software developers, architects, and 
users about how to build secure things” [32]. It is different with application security, 
which focuses on protecting the application after development [17]. 
Software security has three pillars (risk management, software security 
touchpoints, and knowledge) to encourage security awareness among team members [1]. 
Risk management will motivate the team how to understand the business context, how to 
identify the risks, how to rank the risks, how to define the mitigation strategy and validate 
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the solution. Software security touchpoints will encompass analyzing the architectural 
risk, penetration testing, abuse cases, security requirements, security operations, code 
review and risk-based security testing. Knowledge, in terms of software security, will 
provide comprehensive information such as vulnerabilities and attack patterns to enable 
building secure software.    
 
Figure 2.1 The Relationship Among Software Security Knowledge Catalogues, Software 





2.2 Requirements Engineering  
Requirements engineering (RE) is a beginning process in the software 
development lifecycle to collect and document some conditions as a reference for 
satisfying users and solving their problems [33]. This stage should be carefully 
undertaken by the project team. Failure to avoid the requirements error will lead high cost 
to fix it in the future. There are several popular factors that can be a challenge in the 
requirements engineering such as  lack of user input, incomplete requirements and 
specifications, and changing requirements and specifications [34]. 
RE has three core activities: elicitation, documentation, and negotiation. These are 
performed iteratively to establish the software as requested by the stakeholder. Validation 
and management, as additional activities, support the core activities and secure the 
outcomes of RE [33]. 
In the field of software requirements, there are three types of requirements: 
functional requirements, nonfunctional requirements, and constraints [34]. 
1. Functional requirements. These are system action-oriented requirements that 
provide an interaction of system to the user through the inputs, outputs, and 
functions. One of best practices to express functional requirements is utilizing use 
cases. 
2. Nonfunctional requirements. These requirements provide additional attribute to 
the system. There are four categories in this requirement type: usability, 
reliability, performance, and supportability. 
3. Constraints. These are restrictions on the development of system that must be 
completed but should not affect the external behavior of the system. 
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2.3 Security Requirements 
There are two popular definitions of security requirements (SR) in published 
studies. The first definition states SR is a constraint on the functions of the system, whose 
purpose is to satisfy one or more security goals [9], [15], [35]. SR as a constraint will 
specify urgent notes or restrictions of relevant security concerns to the functional 
requirements. For example, a functional requirement states a user’s need to insert their 
username and password to log in to the system. SR would then have the system verify the 
inserted information before allowing them to access the system. 
The second definition argues that SR should be considered as a functional 
requirement [35], [36]. This meaning is similar to the common criteria concept [37], 
which recommends some security mechanisms as a requirement, and provides a 
particular section to discuss the reasons behind them. For example, there is consideration 
that “the user is authenticated by using biometric devices” as a requirement. When this is 
documented in software requirement specifications (SRS), it will encourage people to 
focus on the technical security architectural mechanism and design, rather than the 
foundation why biometric devices are selected.  
In this study, the definition of SR as a constraint is adopted, rather than as a 
functional requirement. In other words, security requirements will document various 
important assets linked to running software such as the information, the communication 
data and the software itself.  
22 
 
2.4 Security Requirements Engineering 
Typically, SRE is performed in the first stage of the software development 
lifecycle. The main activities of SRE include eliciting, analyzing and specifying the 
security requirements. To support the main activities, SRE also talks about validating and 
managing the collected security requirements. The outcomes of SRE are a security 
requirement specification, which describes identified assets, detected threats, potential 
vulnerabilities, analyzed risks and the practices [15], [33].  
Salini and Kanmani [15] state there are some published SRE methods in real 
software development. Some of these are McGraw’s SSDL process, Microsoft’s 
Trustworthy Computing SDLC, Aprville and Purzandi’s SDLC, CLASP 
(Comprehensive, Lightweight Application Security Process), SQUARE (Security Quality 
Requirement Engineering), Haley and his colleague’s framework, Security Requirement 
Engineering Process (SREP), and Secure Tropos. One difference among SRE above is 
the number of activities covered. For example, SQUARE has misuse modeling activity 
while Secure Tropos and CLASP do not have it. Thereafter, SREP performs asset 
identification activity while SQUARE does not. SREP has validation activities while 
Trustworthy Computing SDLC does not. In the authors’ opinion, the most recommended 
SRE method is SREP because it covers most activities of SRE. 
In addition, SRE will heighten people’s awareness to improve and ensure the 
security of software since beginning development.  It can be interpreted by analyzing the 
potential threats, such as abuser, attack, malware and theft. As a result, it will lead to 
protecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of software and its information. 
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2.5 Readiness Models 
In software engineering research, a readiness model was utilized by several 
studies. It was used by Niazi et al. [20] to assess organizational readiness in terms of 
software process improvement. Their readiness model has several levels: aware, defined, 
and optimizing. Each level is supported by some critical factors and barriers. The 
researchers validated their readiness model by performing case studies in three software 
organizations. 
Similarly, Ali and Khan [38] presented a model to measure the readiness of a 
software organization to forming outsourcing relationships. To develop a readiness 
model, they utilized critical partnership factors and their practical implementation. Their 
readiness model also has several levels: contract, success, readiness, conversion and 
maturity. By utilizing case studies in two software organizations, they argue that their 
readiness model has the ability to assist software development outsourcing.  
As a result, a readiness model can be defined as a technique to assess an 
organization or team based on the specified criteria to represent their level of readiness. 
The above studies utilize the Motorola assessment tool and a case study to show the 
usability of their readiness model. The challenges learned from the literature is how to 
construct the levels with practices that can be applied to real software organizations. 
2.6 Related Works on Security Requirements Engineering 
Exploring SRE will not be complete until we understand that it is a part of 
software security. While software security covers overall practiced security knowledge 
and how to integrate it in the software development lifecycle, SRE focuses only on the 
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early phase [1]. This part will describe some published research which motivates this 
study.  
Capturing security requirements is a popular topic in the elicitation step of SRE. 
There are several studies that describe a technique to elicit security requirements in a 
systematic way. El-Hadary and El-Kassas [9] have proposed a technique for eliciting 
security requirements based on problem frames and abuse frames. They used problem 
frames to build a security catalog and to represent security requirements, while abuse 
frames are used for threats modeling. Abuse frames and problem frames were previously 
also utilized by Lin et al [39], [40] to collect threats and vulnerabilities for enhancing 
security requirements engineering. 
Another technique for eliciting security requirements is misuse cases. Sindre and 
Opdahl [41] have proposed misuse cases to capture security threats and requirements. 
Misuse cases provide a visualization of the connection between use cases and misuse 
cases. Although misuse cases have the trustable capability for analyzing threats of 
functional requirements, there are some weaknesses, such as requiring the developer to 
have a high level of understanding to know how to improve the misuse case, and it does 
not cover some kinds of threats.  
Tondel et al. [42] highlighted the high potential of combining misuse cases with 
attack trees [43] to improve security requirements elicitation. They argue attack trees can 
provide references of threats more detail to support the misuse cases. Gandotra et al. [44] 
have a similar consideration to combine the strength of misuse case and attack trees.  
Similar to misuse cases, abuse cases previously have been proposed by 
McDermott and Fox [45]. Although both misuse cases and abuse cases employ the 
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concept of use case, they have an essential difference. While misuse cases are visualized 
in one single diagram with the use case, abuse cases instead are separated.  
Recently, some research has offered a framework to overcome some activities of 
SRE. For instance, Dalpiaz et a. [46] proposed a SecCo framework, which focuses on 
elicitation and specification activity to document security requirements. SecCo works by 
utilizing a commitment view between actors. In addition, Saleem et al. [47] presented the 
framework for eliciting and modeling the security requirements from the business process 
model. They stated their framework is able to model the security requirements on SOA-
based applications. 
Furthermore, Salini and Kanmani [48] presented model oriented security 
requirements engineering (MOSRE) framework. They utilized a use case diagram for 
eliciting security requirements. MOSRE has been applied to E-Health web applications. 
To determine security requirements, it has the ability to identify, quantify and rank the 
risks of the security threats and vulnerabilities. 
Mellado et al. [49] proposed SRE process for software product line (SREPPLine) 
framework. They utilized XML grammar and security reference model in their 
framework. They argued their framework conforms to ISO/IEC 27001 and common 
criteria linked to security requirements management concerns. In addition, common 
criteria [37] as a standardized guideline for eliciting, specifying, and analyzing SR, was 
also utilized in research by Ware et al [50]. They utilize it combined with use cases for 
eliciting SR.  
In order to help people understand and determine which SRE method satisfies 
their needs, Salini and Kanmani [15] provide a comparison among SRE methods based 
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on activities covered, the usage in the organizations, and the techniques utilized. They 
analyzed and compared SQUARE, SREP, Microsoft Trustworthy SDLC, CLASP, Secure 
Tropos, Charles Haley, McGraw, Appvrille and Pourzandi, Gustav Bostrom and 
Colleagues, Eduardo Fernandez, and Gunnar Peterson. 
Recently, some popular studies have discussed how to build a framework for SRE 
[14], [51], [52]. Other fruitful discussions talk about how to implement SRE in cloud 
system development [53]–[55]. In general, every new technology such as the Internet of 
Things (IoT) has its own security challenges. As a result, after discussing the published 
studies above, SRE can be considered as an active area of research.  
2.7 Missing Work 
Much research has been published discussing SRE in term of techniques, 
guidelines, and frameworks. However, it raises a challenge of how to assess the strength 
of SRE implementation in the software industry. There is still no study which provides a 
solution to identify which security area is overlooked in software development. Due to 
the high number of technology challenges and security threats in the future, the software 
industry needs an assistant or tool to indicate the readiness level of their SRE process. 
The readiness model is one of recommended solution to fill the gap described 
above. It can be used as a long-term evaluation tool for assessing the readiness level of 
SRE in the organization. In addition, it can be a trigger to encourage security awareness 






This chapter describes the research methodology to develop a readiness model for 
SRE.  In order to achieve the objectives, there are three phases which need to be 
performed. First, a SMAPS is utilized for identifying the security requirements categories 
and their practices. Second, a readiness model for SRE is iteratively developed by 
considering the outcome of the SMAPS. In the third phase, case studies are conducted to 
evaluate the readiness model based on software organizations’ perspectives. 
3.2 Systematic Mapping Study 
Systematic mapping study (SMAPS) is a kind of advanced literature review [18]. 
SMAPS is different to a systematic literature review in term of purposes, broadness of 
research area, and validity issues. SMAPS will provide analysis of a specific research 
field and investigate the portion and category of published research and existing results in 
the selected field. Based on this methodology, several research questions will be used for 
initializing the selection criteria and data extraction form. All primary studies must 




There are some steps for conducting SMAPS which will be used in this thesis. 
The following steps refers to systematic mapping study research conducted by Petersen et 
al. [18] which specifically in software engineering domain.   
1. Defining the research questions. 
2. Developing the protocol of systematic mapping study. 
3. Collecting the relevant studies by applying the search string to the different 
research databases. 
4. Implementing the selection process into collected studies based on provided 
criteria. 
5. Applying quality assessment into selected findings. 
6. Extracting the data for each selected finding by using provided form. 
7. Analyzing and presenting the collected data.  
 
 





3.2.1 Defining Research Questions 
Research questions should be defined properly before developing the review 
protocol. From research questions, some relevant keywords will be identified. Since 
systematic mapping is time consuming, it is recommended to determine the research 
questions carefully. When a piece of research lacks a research question, some collected 
studies might be not relevant to the objectives. 
The strategy to define the research question focuses on the research objectives. 
Since this research has objectives to develop a readiness model for SRE, the research 
questions are linked to the SRE topic. Commonly, the research questions in existing 
SMAPS research include identifying the key journals that publish relevant research. 
Another one will identify the relevant research in terms of the technique or method 
applied, the research type, the objections, and the contributions. Examples of research 
questions in several systematic mapping studies are shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Example of Research Questions 
No. Research questions example 
1. “What areas in software product line variability are addressed and how many 
articles cover the different areas?” [18] 
2. “What types of papers are published in the area and in particular what type of 





3.2.2 Developing Protocol 
The outcome of the SMAPS depends on the constructed protocol. Several 
important points need to be defined before collecting primary studies. These are 
developing a search strategy, deciding the appropriate research digital libraries as 
sources, determining the selection criteria, and specifying the quality assessment criteria. 
3.2.3  Search Strategy 
The technique to develop a search strategy contains three steps [17]. First, build 
the search string based on population, intervention, outcome of relevance, and 
experimental design. Second, find the synonym of the obtained term from the first step 
and improve it with Boolean operators. The final step is to combine and verify the terms 
previously collected. 
3.2.4 Research Digital Libraries 
Collecting qualified studies relies on the quality of research digital libraries. In 
other words, determining which research digital libraries are used is important. In the 
software engineering context, there are a number of popular research digital libraries, 
such as ACM, IEEE Xplore, Science Direct, Springer Link, and John Wiley.  
Generally, these research digital libraries provide an advanced search service. 
However, the rule of syntax of search string in one research digital library may be 
different from others. For example, applying a search string in Springer will be simpler 
than in ACM. Based on author experience, the most challenging to apply a search string 
in is IEEE Xplore, which needs more iterations to improve the syntax. 
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3.2.5 Selection Criteria 
Selection criteria in the SMAPS are employed to eliminate non-relevant studies. 
There are two kinds of selection criteria: inclusion criteria and exclusion criteria. 
Collecting studies from research digital libraries typically will obtain a large amount of 
research; either it is relevant or not. After defining the inclusion and exclusion criteria in 
the protocol design, people can obtain the relevant studies to for research questions. The 
implementation of selection criteria is by reading the title and abstract of the research. 
Below some examples of inclusion and exclusion criteria which have been 
applied in  published SMAPS research [17]. 
1.  “Publications which focus on motivation factors or de-motivation factors” are 
inclusion criteria.  
2.  “Studies in other domains of knowledge, for example, electrical engineering 
projects” are exclusion criteria.  
3.2.6 Quality Assessment  
Gauging whether research is relevant cannot be done by analyzing the title and 
abstract only. To indicate the research has high quality, some quality assessment criteria 
should be applied. These outcomes of quality assessment will recommend whether the 
research is useful or not. This is an example of quality assessment criteria: “Are the 




3.2.7 Extraction Form 
The last part of protocol design is defining the extraction form. This will be 
utilized in the data extraction process. The fields of the extraction form are the requested 
information in order to answer research questions. Examples of extraction form fields 
include the publication year, the channel sources, the type of contribution, and the 
research type. 
3.2.8 Collecting Relevant Studies 
The activity of collecting relevant studies is performed after the protocol has been 
completed. As described in the research digital libraries section, the challenge of this 
process is how to tailor the search string to be accepted syntax for each research digital 
library. Well-developed search syntax will produce more accurate results. The researcher 
needs to attempt several types of syntax and select the appropriate one.  
3.2.9 Data Extraction Process 
The process of data extraction is the most time-consuming part. The selected 
studies will be analyzed by using the data extraction form. Typically, reading a selected 
study is not enough one-time due to its structure or language. There are two types of 
possible software that can help people to extract the data: Microsoft Excel or State of the 
Art through Systematic Review (StArt). In addition, the result must be organized properly 
to simplify the next process, which is analyzing and presenting the data.  
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3.2.10 Analyzing and Presenting Result 
The last process of the systematic mapping study is analyzing and presenting the 
results. Various information will be obtained and categorized based on the data extraction 
fields. However, this process should carry on analysis which is required by the research 
questions. Then the presented results need to satisfy and answer defined research 
questions. The recommended technique to present the result of the SMAPS is providing 
the table and chart. 
3.3 Readiness Model Development 
Readiness model development is the main process of this thesis. Adapting the 
readiness model concept from several published studies, readiness model development in 
this thesis will utilize the output of the systematic mapping study. It will determine which 
information is used as a list of components. Every component of the readiness model will 
have some practices which are integrated with the Motorola assessment tool. The 
development of the readiness model is not straightforward because it needs iterative 
reviews. 
3.4 Case Study 
A case study has the ability to gain more information based on real-world 
perspectives. In other words, a case study is beneficial to investigate unknown 
information. Therefore, determining the topic is important to optimize the results. 
According to Tellis [56], a case study is utilized to compare the voice of author with a 
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selected group. In addition, a case study can answer the issue of generalization whether 
the contribution of research is applicable in the real world or not. 
 Yin [57] suggested that to properly conduct a case study the practitioners should 
have several capabilities such as the skill when proposing a question and the skill when 
interpreting the response. Also, the practitioners have to be good listeners and flexible 
when unpredictable situations arise.   
Basically, some organizations or practitioners will be invited to attempt the 
offered readiness model. There is a qualification criterion to determine whether the 
respondent is appropriate or not. Technically, a case study can be implemented by 
meeting face to face or through an online form. One case study challenge is to ensure the 
respondent understands what our research is talking about and how to utilize the 
assessment tool properly.  
A case study is considered in this research for a number of reasons: 
1. Demonstrate that the readiness model can be adapted to real software 
development. 
2. Spotlight the part where the readiness model requires improvement. 
3. Demonstrate the benefit of applying the readiness model. 
The expected outcome after applying a case study is that the weaknesses of the 





SYSTEMATIC MAPPING STUDY 
This chapter explains the conducted systematic mapping study (SMAPS) as a 
method to obtain comprehensive information about SRE. The following steps have been 
described in Chapter 3.  A summary will be provided at the end of this chapter. 
4.1 Research Questions 
Before developing design review protocol, we built five research questions to 
initiate the development of SMAPS protocol. Research questions along with their 
motivation are listed in Table 4.1. It directed the analysis process of the SMAPS. It was 
also utilized to limit the scope of the anticipated outcome. The outcome of the SMAPS 
was analyzed to answer these research questions.  
Table 4.1 Research Questions for Systematic Mapping Study 
No. Research Question Motivation 
RQ1 What approaches, techniques and tools 
are available for SRE? 
Identifying the existing solution which 
aims to implement SRE. 
RQ2 What is the limitation of identified SR 
approaches, technique, and tools? 
Identifying the weaknesses for existing 
solutions due to SRE. 
RQ3 Which researchers have produced most 
of the publications in the SRE field? 
Identifying the most active researcher 
in the SRE field. 
RQ4 Which database contains large number 
of publication in SRE field? 
Identify the high interest research 
database for SRE. 
RQ5 What SR categorizations are available? Identify the security requirements 
categories in SRE publications. 
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4.2 Review Protocol 
This section explains the rule of systematic mapping study implementation. Some 
important points in review protocol are determining the research sources, defining the 
selection criteria, developing the search string, collecting studies, assessing the collected 
studies by quality assessment, and extracting the required data. Every point must be 
undertaken carefully to obtain an appropriate result. 
4.2.1 Determining Research Sources 
The selected database sources are IEEE Xplore, ACM, Springer Link, Wiley 
Online Library, and Science Direct. These research sources were selected because they 
provide a large number of software development research, especially security 
requirements engineering. They also provide an advanced searching tool which is suitable 
for a systematic mapping study. The addresses of each research source are listed below. 
Table 4.2 List of Research Sources 
Research sources URL of advance search 
IEEE Xplore http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/search/advsearch.jsp 
ACM  https://dl.acm.org/advsearch.cfm 
Springer Link https://link.springer.com/advanced-search 
Wiley Online http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/mrw/advanced/search 





4.2.2 Defining Selection Criteria 
Selection criteria were utilized to determine whether the collected studies from 
research sources could be selected or not. It contains inclusion and exclusion criteria. A 
study was selected when satisfying all the inclusion criteria as shown in Table 3. When 
the study was detected as having exclusion criteria in Table 4, it was then rejected. The 
purpose of selection criteria was to ensure the studies are relevant to the research 
objectives and have appropriate qualifications. This research adapted the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria from published research of systematic mapping studies [17]. 
Table 4.3 Inclusion Criteria 
No. Inclusion Criteria 
1. Related to secure software engineering domain. 
2. Discussing secure requirement engineering evidence. 
3. Published after 1980 since the Internet appears after that year. 
 
Table 4.4 Exclusion Criteria 
No. Exclusion Criteria 
1. The language is other than English 
2. Papers without sufficient bibliographic information. 
3. Not peer-reviewed publications. 
4. A different domain of knowledge. 
5. Duplicate publication. A complete version will be selected. 
6. Technical reports, white papers, master thesis, Ph.D. dissertation, and 
textbooks are eliminated 
7.  Not relevant to the defined research questions 
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4.2.3 Developing Search Strategy 
This section describes how a search string was applied to the research sources. 
Three steps will be explained. In the first step, we built the search terms by defining the 
population, the intervention, the outcome of relevance, and the experimental design that 
is suitable for our research. 
• Population: secure requirements engineering in software development 
• Intervention: available technique, model, approaches to satisfy secure requirements 
engineering 
• The outcome of relevance: secure requirement engineering technique, SRE model, 
SRE approaches. 
• Experimental design: case study, empirical studies, theoretical studies. 
Based on the results above, the search string was configured by using some keywords 
such as “secure”, “security”, “requirement”, “software”, “engineering”, and “approach”.  
In the second step, we looked for the synonyms of the obtained keywords to 
enhance the quality of the search string. We performed this step due to studies often 
utilizing different words with the same meaning.  
• Secure Requirements Engineering: “Security Requirements” OR “Securing 
Requirements” OR “Secured Requirements Engineering” 
• Approaches:” guideline” OR “technique” OR “technology” OR “tool” OR “model” 
OR “framework” OR “approach” 
The word “secure” has a similar meaning with “security” and “secured” in terms of 
requirements, whereas the word “approaches” contains many potential meanings, such as 
“technique”, “guideline”, “model”, “tool”, and “framework”.  
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In the final step, after identifying the synonym of each keyword, we then 
described a general search string that has been applied in research sources. The full 
search string is defined below.  
Software AND requirement AND (secure OR security OR securing OR secured) AND 
(technique OR method OR technology OR tool OR model OR diagram OR approach OR 
framework OR guideline)  
This search string was tailored to correspond to each research source due to 
different mechanisms. If the accuracy of the search string was low, then the number of 
studies collected was too large. Thereafter, it required greater effort to identify the 
relevant studies. Details of the tailored search strings are listed in Table 5. 
Table 4.5 Tailored Search String Based on Searching Rule in the Research Sources  
Sources Search String 
IEEE TITLE-ABSTR KEY (("Secure Requirement" OR "Security Requirement" 
OR "Trust Requirement")) and TITLE_ABSTR-KEY (("approach" 
OR "method" OR "technique" OR "technology" 
OR "model" OR "diagram" OR "framework" OR "guideline")) 
ACM ("Security Requirement" +OR +"Secure +Requirement") +AND + 
("method" +OR +"technique" +OR +"technology" +OR +"model" +OR 
+"diagram" +OR +"framework" +OR +"guideline" +OR +"approach") 
Science 
Direct 
("Secure Requirement" OR "Security Requirement") AND ("approach" OR 
"method" OR "technique" OR "technology" OR "model" OR "diagram" OR 
"framework" OR "guideline") 
Springer "*secur* requirement*" "*trust* requirement*" 
Wiley ("secure requirement" OR "security requirement" OR "secured requirement" 
OR "securing requirement") in All Fields AND ("approach" OR "technique" 
OR "technology" OR "method" OR "diagram" OR "framework" OR 
"guideline") in All Fields 
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4.2.4 Collecting Relevant Studies 
After applying the search string into research sources, a list of potential studies 
was generated.  It was important to ensure that the result obtained is acceptable. We 
applied the search string into a research source several times due to the low accuracy of 
the results. The number of studies generated was more than a thousand, and most of them 
were not related to research domain. The recommended solution is to improve the search 
string syntax and ensure it follows the rules of each research source. 
There are two steps to identify the study, which will be considered as selected 
studies: 
• Reading the title, keyword, and abstract. 
• Reading the whole publication. 
Reading the title, keyword, and abstract were performed to determine whether it is 
in the domain of our research or not. Inclusion and exclusion criteria were also utilized in 
this step. Duplicate articles and those not relevant to the research topic were eliminated. 
Reading all the content of the collected studies is required when the title and abstract 
need more description. 
4.2.5 Quality Assessment Criteria 
Quality assessment criteria was utilized for measuring the selected studies based 
on the quality of content. Indeed, quality assessment of studies is applied in a systematic 
literature review, but it is not mandatory in a systematic mapping study. The purpose of 
the quality assessment process in a SMAPS is only to support the selection criteria. Note 
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that the SMAPS aims to discover more relevant studies and to generate some essential 
categorizations of information rather than focus on the specific issue. 
We adapted the quality assessment criteria proposed by Nabil et al. [17]. A study 
which obtains a score lower than 4 is then rejected from the selected studies. The detail of 
quality assessment criteria is listed in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 Quality Assessment Criteria 
Criteria Notes 
Are the purposes of the research clearly described? Yes = 1, No = 0 
Are the findings or results clearly stated in the paper?  Yes = 1, No = 0 
Does the research create or add contribution to the 
academia or industry? 
Yes = 1, No = 0 
Is the proposed technique clearly explained? Yes = 1, No = 0 
Is the paper well referenced (i.e. article references from 
various journals and peers reviewed conferences)? 
Yes = 1, Partially =0.5,  
No = 0 
 
4.2.6 Data Extraction 
In the beginning, we utilized a systematic literature review tool, namely StArt 
(State of the Art through Systematic Review). It has the capability to manage the required 
steps in a systematic mapping study, starting from the defining protocol step until the 
extracting data step. However, in our case, this tool has an error when managing 
hundreds of studies. Finally, for managing the extracting data process we continued by 
using Microsoft Excel software.   
In essence, we collected the research information such as the title, publication 
year, authors, and the publisher. There are other classifications which were used for 
extracting data from primary studies as listed below.  
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• Paper channel (journal, workshop, conference, symposium) 
• Empirical type (case study, experiment, survey, other) 
• Approach (framework, method, model, tool, guideline) 
• Requirement activities (elicitation, analysis, specification, verification, 
management) 
• Security requirement type (identification security requirement, authentication 
security requirement, authorization security requirement, etc.) 
• SRE techniques (Misuse case, Problem Frames, CLASP, etc.) 
 The outcome of the data extraction process was utilized to answer defined research 
questions.  
4.3 Findings 
This section presents some categorization of data from the extracting process. We 
present the distribution of primary studies based on research sources, publication channel 
type, and year. In addition, there are some results describing security requirements 
engineering, such as security requirements categories, security requirements techniques, 
and the list of active researchers in security requirements engineering topic. It’s detail 
information were provided in the tables and the figures. 
First, the distribution of primary studies based on research sources was listed in 
Table 4.7 and depicted in Figure 4.1. The most relevant publications for SRE are IEEE 
Xplore, followed by Science Direct, ACM, Springer Link and Wiley Online. Comparing 
the results of the searching process, the initial selection and the final selection, there is a 
higher concentration in the ACM and Science Direct libraries. For example, in the ACM 
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library, the collected studies numbered 371. After performing the selection criteria, it was 
reduced to be 82. Thereafter, based on relevancy and quality assessment criteria, it was 
further reduced to be 14. The reason for this might be due to the search string quality or 
the accuracy of the searching algorithm inside each research digital library. 
Table 4.7 Distribution of Primary Studies Based on Research Sources 
Research sources Total result Initial Selection Final Selection 
IEEE Xplore 146 92 65 
Science Direct 315 35 19 
Springer Link 72 18 2 
ACM 371 82 14 
Wiley Online 20 7 4 
Total 924 234 104 
 
 















Table 4.8 Distribution of Primary Studies Based on Publication Channel 
Publication Channel Amount % 
Journal 31 29.82 
Conference 61 58.65 
Workshop 9 8.65 
Symposium 3 2.88 




Figure 4.2 Selected Studies Based on Publication Channel 
 
Second, we present the primary studies based on the publication channel. As 
shown in Table 4.8 and Figure 4.2, most of the primary studies have been published in 
conferences, followed by journals, workshops and symposiums. It indicates that 
















Figure 4.3 shows the selected studies based on publication year. SRE research 
was begun in 1991. The most active studies were published 10 years later, in 2011. In 
2017, we found seven relevant papers to the SRE studies. As a result, it indicates the SRE 
field is still interesting for research. 
After extracting the data from each selected study, some hidden information was 
obtained. For instance, this research discovers various research types and empirical result 
categories utilized in SRE research. We utilized the classification of research types that 
available in a research by Ouhbi et.al.[58].  
• Evaluation Research: This research will evaluate or investigate the conducted 
approaches. The problems in SRE also were identified in this research. 
• Solution Proposal: This research proposed a solution to SRE problems. This 
solution may be novel or a significant extension of a published approach. The 
potential advantages and the applicability of the solution are indicated with a 











1991 1999 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Conference Journal Others
Figure 4.3 Selected Studies Based on Publication Year 
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• Experience Paper: This paper should show the author’s experience and describe 
what has been done and how it was conducted in practice. 
• Other: e.g., Theoretical papers, opinion papers, reviews. 
Ouhbi et.al [58] also utilized the classification empirical research type as follows 
to represent their systematic mapping study outcomes.  
• Case study: An empirical inquiry to investigate the impact of approach within 
real-life situations. 
• Survey: A method for collecting information from selected respondent to gain 
quantitative data.  
• Experiment: An empirical method applied under controlled conditions. 
As depicted in Figure 4.4, most SRE publications use the solution paper as their 
research type and utilize the case study technique for providing empirical evidence. 
Thereafter, the information in Figure 4.4 could be essential for other researchers to 
determine the suitable research type and the empirical result category for their research in 
future. 
In addition, this research recognizes the most active researchers in SRE 
publications as listed in Table 4.9. Generally, they worked in a collaboration for several 
papers. For example, Eduardo, Mario Piattini, and Daniel Melado have been involved in 
same publication. If we are interested on SRE topic, we may follow or communicate with 
them to obtain an update about this topic. Moreover, we also may invite them to 















Figure 4.4 Research Type and Empirical Result Type 
 
Table 4.9 List of Active Authors in SRE Research 
Author # Papers 
Eduardo Fernández-Medina 10 
Mario Piattini  10 
Daniel Mellado  7 
S. Kanmani  6 
P. Salini 6 
Giorgini, Paolo 4 
Dalpiaz, Fabiano 3 
Massacci, Fabio 3 
Opdahl, Andreas L. 3 
Paja, Elda 3 
Sindre, Guttorm 3 














Table 4.10 Security Requirements Categories 
Security Requirement Category 
Number of Studies 
(n=104) 
% 
Identification security requirements 5 4.81 
Authentication security requirements 30 28.85 
Authorization security requirements 35 33.65 
Immunity security requirements 3 2.88 
Privacy security requirements 20 19.23 
Integrity security requirements 27 25.96 
Physical protection security requirements 8 7.69 
Non-repudiation security requirements 14 13.46 
Intrusion detection security requirements 8 7.69 
System maintenance security requirements 8 7.69 
Secure auditing security requirements 10 9.62 
Survivability security requirements 15 14.42 
Not specific 40 38.46 
 
We have collected various SR categories from selected studies as listed in Table 
4.10. Not every selected study in our SMAPS discusses the category of security 
requirements in detail.  Authorization security requirements is the most discussed by 
primary studies, which occurs in 35 publications, followed by authentication, integrity 
and privacy security requirements. 
There are some publications which described various SR categories in SRE, such 
as research by Al-Shorafat [59], Zafar et al. [60], and Felderer et al. [61]. However, due 
to the usability and popularity, this study selected the SR categories from research by 




Table 4.11 Security Requirements Engineering Techniques 
Security Requirements Engineering 
Technique 
Number of Studies 
(n=104) 
% 
Misuse case 23 22.12 
UML 8 8.25 
Common criteria 8 7.69 
Attack tree 7 6.73 
I* framework 6 5.77 
Secure Tropos 6 5.77 
Problem frame 5 4.81 
UMLSec 5 4.81 
SREP 5 4.81 
SQUARE 4 3.85 
ISO/IEC 270001 4 3.85 
Security use case 4 3.85 
CLASP 2 1.92 
MOSRE 2 1.92 
 
There are various techniques applied in SRE research. The common techniques in 
SRE research are listed in Table 4.11. The misuse case is the most utilized in SRE 
research, followed by UML, common criteria, attack tree, I* framework and Secure 
Tropos. Some studies used the misuse case as a technique that collaborated with other 
techniques, such as research by P. Salini and S. Kanmani [63]. Whereas Sindre and 





Table 4.12 Security Requirements Engineering Activities 




Elicitation 44 42.31 
Negotiation/ Analysis 29 41.35 
Documentation 43 27.88 
Verification 9 8.65 
Management/ Change Management 4 3.85 
Not specific 12 11.54 
Based on Table 4.12, most of selected studies discuss SRE in elicitation and 
analysis activity. Some publications have concern specifically in one activity, such as 
research by Shaman and Ivan [64], which focused on elicitation, and research by Nauman 
et al. [60], which focused on analysis activity. The research has more than one SRE 
activity for a number of reasons, such as the need to develop a complete framework [10], 
there is a need for obtaining a comprehensive result [65], and the linkage between 
activities to execute the technique completely [66]. 
The terms of negotiation, analysis, and modeling are classified within one 
activity. These terms existed in different publications with same purpose, which is 
investigating the elicited SR. Similarly, the terms documentation and specification are 
activities in selected studies that have the same objective. Few studies discuss research in 
management activities. The reason for this is because of the high effort required. For 
example, a researcher should be involved in practical software project development in the 




4.4 Answering Research Questions  
RQ1. What approaches, techniques and tools are available for SRE? 
Table 4.11 presents some approaches which are popular in SRE research. Misuse 
cases are the most utilized by researchers. From 104 selected studies, 22.12 % conducted 
research by using the misuse case. This is followed by 7.69 % studies using UML, 7.69 
% studies which discussed common criteria, 6.73 % studies which performed attack tree, 
5.77 % studies which utilized I* framework, and 5.77 % studies which are interested in 
Secure Tropos.  
The misuse cases is considered a technique which is an extension of the use case 
and has the capability to identify threats [67]. It offers the misuse case as a negation of 
the use case to recognize the behavior of a misuser. A misuser is actor whose behavior is 
harmful to the system. By utilizing the misuse case, various mitigations can be developed 
as security requirements to prevent a potential threat to the system. This is the reason that 
misuse cases are popular in SRE research, especially in elicitation activity. 
 Common criteria (CC) provides updated security mechanisms which are utilized 
by some selected studies. First, CC is utilized as complementary, as suggested by 
research by Mellado et al. [68], which integrated CC with ISO/IEC 17799. Second, CC is 
utilized as a main technique in SRE research, such as a study by Ware et al [69] to elicit 
security requirements.  
Several tools are offered by several selected studies, such as SREPPLine tool [49] 
for product line topic, SSC4Cloud tool [70] for cloud  environment, and ST-Tool [71] for 
data and privacy assessment in web technology. Although UML has a capability for 
visualizing, it cannot be considered as a tool. Instead it is considered as a technique.   
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RQ2. What are the limitations of the identified security requirements approaches, 
techniques, and tools? 
Based on analyzing the selected studies, we obtained some limitations of 
presented techniques which are described by researchers in order to propose new 
techniques. The misuse case as a popular technique in SR elicitation has some 
weaknesses. First, misuse cases are considered not comprehensive for identifying threats 
and the malicious actor. Second, the outcome of misuse cases is difficult to be validated. 
For large and complex systems having more threats, misuse case diagram is not 
recommended as it will be a challenge to read so many cross edges in the diagram [72]. 
Although the misuse case diagram shows attacks or threats, it does not have the ability to 
explain in detail on how these attacks can be detected. 
 The attack tree is other popular technique in SRE research. Despite the attack 
trees have some benefits over the misuse cases, it does not offer information about 
preconditions and mitigation policies corresponding to the threats [72]. Therefore, it is 
recommended to overlap the two techniques to meet the aforementioned deficiencies. 
RQ3. Which researchers have the most publications in the SRE field? 
Based on Table 4.9, the most active researchers are Eduardo Fernández-Medina 
and Mario Piattini. They collaborated with Daniel Mellado to focus on improvement 
security requirements engineering in the software product line [49], [73]. P. Salini, and S. 
Kanmani also worked together in SRE in order to provide the MOSRE framework to be 
applied in several projects [10], [74]. Unfortunately, Eduardo et al. published their latest 




RQ4. Which database contains an appropriate number of publications in the SRE 
field? 
Database sources of research are listed in Table 4.7 and indicate that we can get 
relevant publications of SRE in IEEE Xplore, followed by Science Direct and ACM. 
Most published studies in these database sources are categorized as conference papers. 
RQ5. What SR categorization are available? 
According to the Table 4.10, there are various SR categories as listed below. 
• Identification security requirement 
• Authentication security requirement 
• Authorization security requirement 
• Immunity Security Requirement 
• Privacy Security Requirement 
• Integrity Security Requirement 
• Physical Protection Security Requirement 
• Non-repudiation Security Requirement 
• Intrusion Detection Security Requirement 
• System Maintenance Security Requirement 
• Secure Auditing Security Requirement 







This chapter summarizes the development process of a security requirements 
engineering readiness model (SRERM). Before applying this SRERM in the real software 
industry, we need to determine the structure of the proposed readiness model, the proper 
measurement instruments, and the suitable assessment tool. In addition, a feedback 
evaluation form was developed to gain comments from respondents. Internal reviews and 
iterative changes were performed before external evaluation in the real software industry. 
The flow process of SRERM development is depicted in Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1 SRERM Development 
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5.2 Structure of SRERM 
This section explains SRERM in terms of structure. SRERM is purposed to assist 
organizations in quantifying their readiness corresponding to the SRE activities. SRERM 
structure is motivated by the software improvement process readiness model (SPIRM) 
[20], the software outsourcing vendor readiness model (SOVRM) [75], and the software 
outsourcing partnership model (SOPM) [38] concept. Some parts of these models are 
utilized in this research such as the measurement level concept, the assessment tool and 
collecting feedback from respondents. The difference with SRERM is the content of the 
levels. While the above models utilized critical success factors (CSFs), this research 
instead uses security requirements categories (SRCs). 
 
Figure 5.2 The Structure of SRERM 
Figure 5.2 shows the flow process of SRERM development. The results of the 
SMAPS, which are security requirements categories, are utilized to construct the SRERM 
structure. The preliminary SRERM structure has three dimensions: levels, security 
components (SCs), and SRE practices. 
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5.2.1 Preliminary Levels of SRERM 
The levels of SRERM are purposed to represent the readiness achievement degree 
of software organizations in undertaking SRE. Following are the five preliminary levels 
of the SRERM for software development organizations.  
1. Initial: This readiness level can be recognized as having a confused status. At this 
level, the organization does not provide any preparation for security requirements 
engineering. 
2. Basic: This readiness level indicates the concern on developing basic security 
requirements for software development. At this level, organizations realize 
security requirements is mandatory in software development. 
3. Protected:  This level analyzes security requirements related to the information 
and assets.  
4. Anticipated: At this level prevention and greater awareness are emphasized.  
5. Monitored: This is the highest readiness level. At this level, organizations have a 
high focus on maintaining security requirements built at the previous level. 
The levels classification was developed based on the main purpose of each security 
requirements and the prerequisite. For instance, the basic level shall contain the 
components required as a prerequisite to support the components at the protected level. 
Overall readiness levels in the SRERM require evaluation and feedback to be 
sufficient for analyzing the SRE readiness in the organizations. When a conflict among 
security requirements components is found, or some suggestions relating to the 
representation of the readiness model are received, correction and improvement should 
then be rapidly undertaken. Figure 5.3 represents how SRERM levels recognize the 
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organization’s performance and how the discoveries from the SMAPS are distributed into 
the SRERM levels. 
 
Figure 5.3 The Preliminary SRERM Levels 
5.2.2 Components of SRERM  
The SPI readiness model [20] was used to distribute the critical success factors 
and the barriers of software process improvement to each level. The SOPM [38] utilized 
the critical success factor of the outsourcing relationship. This research follows these 
concepts in order to develop the levels of the SRERM which distribute the security 
requirement components. The security requirements components in our research referred 
to the security requirements categories, which were collected through the SMAPS. Some 
SRE practices were also developed based on outcomes of the SMAPS and RE activities. 
The detail of the SRE practices are available in the appendix B.  
Twelve security requirements (SR) categories, identified via mapping study 
(RQ5), were distributed into five preliminary readiness levels as depicted in Table 5.1. 
The distribution of these security categories was based on the prioritization which was 
obtained from the SMAPS. Each level contains some security requirements categories 
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except the initial one. A focus column is added in Table 5.1 to describe the motivation or 
situation of each readiness level.  
Identification SR, authentication SR, and authorization SR were distributed in the 
basic level because they are mandatory for each system. Immunity SR, privacy SR, and 
integrity SR were placed in the protected level because they are suitable for protecting 
important assets. Consideration for physical protection SR, non-repudiation SR, and 
intrusion SR in the anticipated level because it will require high effort. System 
maintenance SR, secure auditing SR, and survivability SR were also placed in the 
monitored level because the cost of these SRs is very high and commonly purposed for 
the sustainability of the organizations’ long-term goals. 
Table 5.1 Detail information of Preliminary SRERM Levels 
No SRERM Level Focus Security Requirement Categories 
1 Initial 





Securing user’s access Identification Security Req. 
Authentication Security Req. 
Authorization Security Req. 
3 Protected 
Securing transactions  Immunity Security Req. 
Privacy Security Req. 




Physical Protection Security Req. 
Non-repudiation Security Req. 
Intrusion Detection Security Req. 
5 Monitored 
Security for long term 
goals  
System Maintenance Security Req. 
Secure Auditing Security Req. 
Survivability Security Req. 
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5.3 Assessment Tool 
The Motorola assessment tool [22] is the measurement tool used in the SRERM. 
As shown in Table 5.2, it is utilized to assess the practices for each security requirements 
component. This tool has been used in SPIRM [75], SOVRM [38] and SOPM [38]. The 
Motorola assessment tool requires three assessment aspects [22]: 
• Approach: This aspect focuses on the support of management and the commitment 
of the organization relating to the practice. 
• Deployment: This aspect focuses on the comprehensiveness and consistency of the 
practice deployment. 
• Results: This aspect focuses on the positive results in term of the effect scale in the 
project.  
Table 5.2 Motorola Assessment Tool 
Score Approach (A) Deployment (D) Results (R) 
Poor (0) • No management 
recognition of need 
(OR) 
• No organizational 
ability (OR) 
• No organizational 
commitment (OR) 
• Practice not evident  
• No part of the 
organization uses 
the practice (OR) 




Weak (2) • Management begins 
to recognize need 
(OR) 
• Support items for 
the practice start to 
• Fragmented use 
(OR) 
• Inconsistent use 
(OR) 
• Deployed in 




• Some evidence 
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be created (OR) 
• A few parts of 
organization are able 
to implement the 
practice  
some parts of the 
organization 
(OR) 
• Limited to 
monitoring/verifi
cation of use 
of effectiveness 












• Several supporting 
items for the 
practice in place  
• Less fragmented 
use (OR) 
• Some consistency 
in use (OR) 
• Deployed in 





cation of use for 
several parts of 
the organization 
• Reliable and 
positive results 










• Some management 
commitment (OR) 






parts of the 
organization (OR) 
• Supporting items in 
• Deployed in 
some parts of the 
organization 
(OR) 
• Mostly consistent 
use across many 




cation of use for 
• Positive 
measurable 
results in most 












many parts of the 
organization 
 
Qualified (8) • Total management 
commitment (OR) 
• Majority of 
management is 
proactive (OR) 
• Practice established 
as an integral part of 
the process (OR) 
• Supporting items 
encourage and 
facilitate the use of 
practice  
• Deployed in 
almost all parts of 
the organization 
(OR) 
• Consistent use a 
cross almost all 




cation of use for 
almost all parts of 
the organization  
• Positive 
measurable 
results in almost 





over time across 










excellence in the 
practice recognized 
even outside the 
organization 
• Universal and 
constant 
deployed in all 
parts of the 
organization 
(OR) 
• Consistent use 
over time across 




cation for all 












For each aspect, we select a value (0, 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10) which can be determined 
referring to the criteria provided in Table 5.2. Here, we explain how to utilize the 
Motorola assessment tool by assuming the scores have been computed as shown in the 
Table 5.3. 
• First, for each practice calculate the total score of three aspects (approach, 
deployment, and result), then divide the total by three to find the average and round 
to a whole number. 
• Second, repeat the first step to overall practice in one security component.   
• Third, sum the average of every practice and divide by the number of practices for 
each security component.  
Fourth, repeat the third step and find the average for each level. If the level gains average 
score is less than seven it is regarded as weak, whereas higher than or equal to seven is 
strong. 
Table 5.3 The Example of Security Component Evaluation 







1. Utilize brainstorming 
technique to aggregate 
identification security 
requirements  
10 10 10 10 
2. Identify system 
stakeholders to improve 
identification security 
requirements 
8 8 8 8 
3. Plan for conflicts and 
conflict resolution for 




requirements in term of 
stakeholders  
4. Define standard templates 
for describing identification 
security requirements 
8 8 8 8 
5. Use languages simply and 
concisely to explain 
identification security 
requirements 
8 8 8 8 
6. Check that identification 
security requirements meets 
your standard 
8 8 8 8 
7. Define change management 
policies for identification 
security requirements 
4 4 4 4 
Total of average scores (Calculate all scores in Average column) 46 
Final score (Total of average scores divided by number of practices)  
= 46/7 = 7.7 
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5.4 Evaluation Process of SRERM 
The evaluation step for the SRERM is an important stage to validate and improve 
the applicability of the SRERM for the real software industry. Two case studies in the 
software industry were rigorously carried out. The respondents of the evaluation were 
selected once they were determined to have the capability and experience to answer a 
question in the SRERM. In the evaluation agreement, it is also stated for privacy and 
business considerations that their affiliated organizations will not be published. Finally, 
they completed both the SRERM and the feedback section.  
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Once the case studies were completed, respondents were requested to complete 
the questionnaire for assessing the quality of the SRERM. Overall criteria were explained 
in the evaluation criteria section. The outcomes of the SRERM evaluation were utilized 
for analyzing the weaknesses. The respondent suggested some changes to aid future 
improvement of the object.   
5.4.1 Evaluation Criteria 
Criteria in the feedback section are described below. 
1. Ease of use: This criterion assesses and evaluates the usability of the SRERM 
structure. It requires the SRERM structure to have flexibility and be unambiguous 
because complex models will require a higher effort and training.  
2. Satisfaction of user: This criterion assesses and evaluates users’ satisfaction 
according to the outcomes of the SRERM. They should have a chance to utilize 
the SRERM without any misunderstanding or difficulties to achieve the goals 
related to the SRE domain. 
3. The structure of the SRERM: This criterion’s purpose is to recognize any gaps 
in the SRERM structure and how to make improvements for these. 
The complete detail of the evaluation form of the SRERM is provided in appendix. 
5.4.2 Evaluation Analysis 
The outcome of the conducted SRERM will be analyzed in terms of the obtained 
score, feedback information, and suggestions from the respondent. The score of each 
organization certainly will not be the same due to different criteria. The plan is to conduct 
the SRERM in a well-established and growing organization. This study will identify the 
interesting area of SRE for each respondent. 
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 The feedback section will be used as consideration whether the SRERM achieves 
satisfaction of the user or not. It also will indicate whether there is any suggestion for 
improving the SRERM. When a curious result is discovered, or an urgent suggestion 







A case study has the ability to gain more information based on real world-
perspectives. This advantage is suited with our need that the SRERM requires an 
evaluation from a practitioner in the software industry. We utilized a case study in this 
research for the following reasons: 
• To demonstrate that the SRERM can be adapted to real software development. 
• To highlight the areas where the SRERM requires improvement. 
• To demonstrate the benefit of applying the SRERM. 
To achieve confidence in the evaluation, this research conducted two case studies 
on two different software development organizations. The selected organizations have a 
clear software development processes. They also allow the research to be released with 
their identity disguised. 
Initially, we personally communicated to each respondent from the different 
organizations, introducing the concept of the SRERM and inviting them to participate in 
our case study. Considering the quality of the respondents’ feedback, training and 
introductory discussion were carried out at the beginning. Although they are unfamiliar 
with security requirements engineering research, due to their knowledge of security 
mechanisms they may rapidly learn how to utilize the SRERM. 
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6.2 Result  
We have conducted the case study in two organizations: organization A and 
organization B. Both organizations are providing software development service for their 
customers. We selected these organizations by considering the maturity, employee 
number, customer number, and number of branches. For each organization, we selected 
the respondent who has strong role in the software development process.  
The outcomes of each organization assessment are then collected in Tables 6.1 
and 6.2. Each respondent was required to utilize their experience in completed projects to 
undertake the assessment. Due to quality concerns and independent feedback, the 
respondent was requested to complete the questionnaire at their place of business. In a 
short period of time, they submitted the assessment outcomes including the SRERM 
evaluation form through email. The assessment outcomes and SRERM evaluation were 
reviewed and utilized to produce an analysis report. 
6.2.1 Organization A 
Organization A is a well-established software development organization working 
for customers around the world. They have branches in Asia, Australia, Europe, and 
America. The number of their employee is around 700 people. They support a number of 
oil companies by developing services such as real-time monitoring, data analytics, and 
reporting. The respondent of organization A has 17 years of experience in developing 
software. Currently, his position is a software development manager. One of his 
responsibility is ensuring the requirements analysis process is implemented and can 
satisfy the customer’s need.  
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6.2.2 Assessment Outcomes of Organization A 
Organization A obtained a high score at the basic level. This indicated their 
security awareness is established from the earliest point of the software development 
lifecycle. At the protected level, they achieved a high score in two SRs (the immunity SR 
and privacy SR). It shows that they have awareness of the threat of malware and of 
privacy issues. However, their integrity SR score and the SRs at the monitored level are 
very low as they are still planning and discussing these concerns. This information was 
used to evaluate and improve the SRERM. 




No. Level Score Status 
1. Initial Nil    
2. Basic 
Identification Security Requirements 7.5 strong 
Authentication Security Requirements 8.2 strong 
Authorization Security Requirements 8.5 strong 
3. Protected 
Immunity Security Requirements 7.6 strong 
Privacy Security Requirements 7.1 strong 
Integrity Security Requirements 0.8 weak 
4. Anticipated 
Physical Protection Security Requirements 3.2 weak 
Non-repudiation Security Requirements 2.1 weak 
Intrusion Detection Security Requirements 5.1 weak 
5. Monitored 
System Maintenance Security Requirements 0 weak 
Secure Auditing Security Requirements 1 weak 
Survivability Security Requirements 0 weak 
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6.2.3 Organization B 
Organization B is a growing software development organization working for a 
university. They develop various integrated software such as class a registration system, 
an e-learning system, a payment system, a graduation system, an attendance system, a 
network settings system, and a library system. The main core of the organization’s 
service is data center management and software development.  
We selected this organization to represent a non-international organization with 
fewer employees. The number of their employee is less than 100 people. In addition, this 
organization has only one customer, which is a university. As a result, organization B 
was expected could add more usability value to the SRERM. 
The selected respondent is the senior developer in the organization B. His 
experience in developing the system is around 5 years. He has a strong role in the 
software development, especially the requirement analysis process. He has a 
responsibility to analyze the customer’s need and develop the system. 
6.2.4 Assessment Outcomes of Organization B 
Organization B has been in the initial level because they have not completed the 
security component at the basic level. For a growing organization, this level achievement 
shows that their awareness of security requirements engineering has not been started. 
They need more support and commitment from management to encourage their team to 




Table 6.2 Implementation Score for SCs in the Organization B 
SRERM Levels Security Component Organization B 
No. Level  Score Status 
1. Initial Nil   
2. Basic 
Identification Security Requirements 5.7 weak 
Authentication Security Requirements 8 strong 
Authorization Security Requirements 7.7 strong 
3. Protected 
Immunity Security Requirements 2.4 weak 
Privacy Security Requirements 4.4 weak 
Integrity Security Requirements 2.1 weak 
4. Anticipated 
Physical Protection Security Requirements 7.3 strong 
Non-repudiation Security Requirements 2.7 weak 
Intrusion Detection Security Requirements 1.3 weak 
5. Monitored 
System Maintenance Security Requirements 3.3 weak 
Secure Auditing Security Requirements 3.1 weak 
Survivability Security Requirements 4.7 weak 
 
The result of organization B also indicates there is concern enough for the 
physical protection SR and the survivability SR. In contrast, they obtained a low score in 
identification SR. One of the possible reasons because they have only several 
stakeholders for their systems. As a result, they are able to describe the identification 
security requirements without completing all the provided practices in the SRERM. 
These findings were used for improving the SRERM. 
6.3 Feedback Summary 
Both respondents from organizations A and B completed the feedback forms to 
evaluate various aspects of the SRERM. As we described in the section of SRERM 
development, there are three key aspects (ease of use, the satisfaction of the user, and the 
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structure of the SRERM). It was evaluated by using quantitative measurement. In 
addition, some questions were provided to collect their reviews, suggestions, or 
constructive corrections for improving the SRERM.  
First, they were asked to evaluate the ease of the learning aspect. Based on Table 
6.3, organizations A and B positively agreed that the form of SRERM is clear and easy to 
learn. However, training is still required to understand how to utilize the SRERM 
properly. Although they are familiar with the requirements engineering process and 
security mechanisms, they recently learnt about SRE.     
Table 6.3 Ease of Learning Evaluation of Organization A and B 
Ease of Learning 
Organizations’ perception (n=2) 
Positive Negative Neutral 
SA A % SD D % N % 
SRERM representation is clear  0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
A little knowledge of security 
requirements engineering is required to 
learn how to use SRERM 
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
It is applicable to learn the practices 
arranged for each security requirements 
component  
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
It is applicable to learn the assessment 
method 
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
It is applicable to utilize the SRERM to 
measure organizations readiness for 
security requirements engineering.  
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
It is applicable to utilize distribution of 
security requirements components 
among various levels, e.g. 
Identification, Authentication, and 
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
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Authorization in Basic Level 
Some trainings should be 
accommodated for the utilization of 
SRERM 
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Second, they assessed the user satisfaction aspect. As described in the evaluation 
criteria section, this criterion assesses and evaluates users’ satisfaction corresponding to 
the results of the SRERM. As Table 6.4 shows, both organizations agreed that the 
SRERM could be useful in other organizations. They were interested to utilize this 
SRERM in their work if it is available in their organizations. They were satisfied with the 
capability of the SRERM to recognize the area of their SRE which needs further 
improvement.   
Table 6.4 User Satisfaction Evaluation of Organization A and B 
User Satisfaction 
Organizations’ perception (n=2) 
Positive Negative Neutral 
SA A % SD D % N % 
SRERM is can be executed to the 
most organizations 
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
Every practice is obvious to learn and 
clear 
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
Utilizing the SRERM would 
distinguish strong and weak areas in 
the organizations corresponding to 
the security requirements engineering 
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
Using the SRERM would improve 
our security requirements 
engineering  
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
When SRERM were accessible for 
my occupation, I anticipate that I 
would utilize it later on. 
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
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I am fulfilled and approved with the 
readiness issues recognized by 
SRERM. 
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
It is critical to actualizing SRERM as 
an automated software tool to 
encourage security requirements 
engineering in measuring 
organization’s readiness. 
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Third, the structure aspect of the SRERM was evaluated by two organizations as 
shown in Table 6.5. They agreed the arrangement of the SRERM structure is suited and 
obvious. The creation of levels and the distribution of security requirement categories 
have no confusion or ambiguity. Based on their evaluation outcomes, SRERM can be 
utilized to effectively measure the SRE readiness of software development organizations.  
Table 6.5 SRERM Structure Evaluation of Organization A and B 
Structure of SRERM 
Organizations’ perception (n=2) 
Positive Negative Neutral 
SA A % SD D % N % 
Every component of the SRERM are 
self-explanatory and require no further 
clarification to be utilized adequately 
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
Every component of the SRERM are 
feasible and are suited in security 
requirement engineering process 
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
The SRERM can be used effectively to 
identify security requirements 
engineering readiness issues with a 
goal of increasing organizations 
readiness for security requirement 




The distribution of security component 
among various readiness levels (e.g. 
identification, authentication, and 
authorization) is valuable 
0 2 100% 0 0 0 0 0 




0 0 0 0 0 
 
Fourth, we received a suggestion and criticism from organization A only. The 
respondent of organization A suggested a modification related to the levels of the 
SRERM. The SRERM is recommended to have four levels instead of five levels. A 
criticism was made that the document needed improvement because the respondent 
already utilizes a requirement engineering template from JIRA. In addition, the design of 
the questionnaire is advised to be improved in future. This feedback was utilized in the 
next section, which discusses the modification of the SRERM. 
Table 6.6 Feedback Results of Organization A and B 
Question 
Response 
Organization A Organization B  
Do you suggest any 
correction or enhancement 
to the SRERM? 
It would be good if 
SRERM can have a 
level of the appliance. 
i.e. Level 1 covers 
Initial and Basic 
state, Level 2 covers 
additionally Protected 
and highest level – 3 






Do you suggest any new 
components to the SRERM 
in the future and please 
provide the reason? 
No No Very 
Positive 
Opinion corresponding to 
the assessment method. 
Perhaps need to make 
a clear definition 
which part is a 
document is required 
which one is the only 
statement. Or the 
implementation in 
another format, I.e. 
When a company 
doesn't use document 
but tool instead (i.e. 
Jira) 
No Positive 
Opinion corresponding to 
the distribution of various 
security requirements 
practices 
No No Very 
Positive 
Opinion corresponding to 
the SRERM usability with 
respect to time it takes the 
respondent to quantify 
security requirements 
engineering readiness. 
Probably it is better 
to redesign the format 
when the parameters 
are same for each 
level. 
No Positive 







6.4 Modification of SRERM 
Based on the outcomes of two case studies, we then applied some modifications 
to the SRERM. The modifications were purposed to achieve higher usability of the 
SRERM in the software industry. When the usability value of the SRERM is high, it will 
be correspondingly easier to attract more software organizations to utilize the SRERM.  
The changes were related to moving the position of a security requirements component 
across levels and merging one level into another.  
First, the physical protection security requirements component was moved from 
the anticipated level (third level) to the protected level (second level). This was motivated 
by the outcome of organization B that indicated high interest to secure the physical 
protection SR. They considered the physical properties of the server as important as the 
security of information. The physical server should be protected from any challenges 
such as theft, vandalism, fire, and natural disasters. 
Second, due to the suggestion by the respondent of organization A, we merged the 
anticipated level with the monitored level. Therefore, non-repudiation SR and intrusion 
detection SR were distributed at the monitored level. We considered non-repudiation SR 
to be at the monitored level because it had the purpose of advancing the quality of 
software security. In addition, intrusion detection SR was considered to be at the 
monitored level due to its providing high-quality security.    
Finally, these modifications were updated in the SRERM as shown in Figure 6.1 
and Table 6.7. The modifications were motivated by the assessment results obtained in 
the case studies of organizations A and B. The modifications also affected the practices 
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for each security component. We ensured the modification of the SRERM does not 
reduce the usability. 
 
Figure 6.1 Modified Levels of SRERM 





Focus Security Components 
1 Initial 
The situation without any 
SR component included 
Nil 
2 Basic Securing user’s access 
Identification Security Req. 
Authentication Security Req. 
Authorization Security Req. 
3 Protected 
Securing transactions and 
another important asset 
Immunity Security Req. 
Privacy Security Req. 
Integrity Security Req. 
Physical Protection Security Req. 
4 Monitored 
Prevention, providing high-
quality security, and support 
long-term goals  
Survivability Security Req. 
Intrusion Detection Security Req. 
Non-repudiation Security Req. 
Secure Auditing Security Req. 
System Maintenance Security Req. 
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Based on Table 6.7, the modified SRERM has four levels. The initial level will 
indicate the organization has no interest to implement SRE in software development. The 
basic level will indicate the organization has established the awareness of SRE for the 
mandatory security components. The protected level will indicate the organization has a 
high concern to implement SRE by ensuring the security of their data. Lastly, the 
monitored level will indicate the organizations are motivated to implement SRE by 
adding advanced services. 
6.5 Second Case Study 
We conducted second case study on organization A and C. Generally, it was 
purposed to evaluate the modified SRERM. As previous case study, one of the 
anticipated advantages conducting case study is assessing its applicability and usability in 
the real software organizations. The detail explanation of the specific objectives and the 
outcomes are described in the following sections.  
6.5.1 Second Case Study of Organization A 
There are two main objectives of second case study on organization A. First, we 
tried to observe the improvement of SRE in this organization after six months. We would 
compare the previous case study outcomes with the outcome of second case study. 
Second, we aimed to check the user satisfaction of organization A to the improved 
SRERM. Since we incorporated several recommendations from organization A to 
improve the SRERM, their reviews became essential in the second case study. 
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6.5.2 Assessment Outcomes of Second Case Study of Organization A 









1. Initial Nil    
2. Basic 
Identification Security Requirements 7.5 7.5 
Authentication Security Requirements 8.2 8.2 
Authorization Security Requirements 8.5 8.5 
3. Protected 
Immunity Security Requirements 7.6 7.6 
Privacy Security Requirements 7.1 7.1 
Integrity Security Requirements 0.8 5.4 
Physical Protection Security Requirements 3.2 4.3 
5. Monitored 
Non-repudiation Security Requirements 2.1 4.2 
Intrusion Detection Security Requirements 5.1 6.1 
System Maintenance Security Requirements 0 2.3 
Secure Auditing Security Requirements 1 2.7 
Survivability Security Requirements 0 2.6 
 
Based on Table 6.8, comparing the result of previous case study with the second 
case study, organization A has improvement in several security requirements categories. 
For example, the integrity SR is increasing from previously 0.8 to be 5.4. Although their 
SRE position is still in the basic level, but it indicates there is an improvement in the 
organization. In addition, various security requirements categories in this organization 
have been motivated such as physical protection, non-repudiation, intrusion detection, 
system maintenance, secure auditing, and survivability security requirements categories. 
The respondent of organization A recognized and agreed with the modification of 
SRERM, especially the modified levels. In the feedback section, he did not put any 
80 
 
comments or suggestions to the modified SRERM. However, he agreed that the modified 
SRERM could satisfy the ease of learning evaluation, user satisfaction evaluation, and 
structure evaluation.  
6.5.3 Second Case Study of Organization C 
We conducted a case study in organization C to evaluate the modified SRERM. 
Organization C has main responsibility to provide IT services for a university in Saudi 
Arabia. The number of employee is around 160 people. They are developing several 
education systems such as student registration system, academic portal system, room 
booking system, and library system. 
The selected respondent of organization C is a senior developer. He has 
experiences in software development more than 5 years. In addition, he has conducted a 
research in the field of software engineering when he was a graduate student in the 
university. As a result, he could understand the purpose and the essential of the SRERM. 
6.5.4 Assessment Outcomes of Second Case Study of Organization C 
Similar to the previous case studies, we provided concisely an introduction of the 
SRERM in a meeting with the respondent. An online form service was utilized to 
establish the questionnaire and to collect the respondent’s answers. He was requested to 
complete the questionnaire that contains assessment of SRERM, easy of learning 
evaluation, user satisfaction evaluation, structure evaluation, and feedback form.  
Once respondent completed the questionnaire, the inserted answers were extracted 
and analyzed based on the defined evaluations. Following information describe the case 
study outcomes that was completed by respondent of organization C.  
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Table 6.9 Implementation Score for SCs in Organization C 
SRERM Level Security Component Organization B 
No. Level  Score Status 
1. Initial Nil   
2. Basic 
Identification Security Requirements 5.1 weak 
Authentication Security Requirements 4.7 weak 
Authorization Security Requirements 5.1 weak 
3. Protected 
Immunity Security Requirements 8.0 strong 
Privacy Security Requirements 6.1 weak 
Integrity Security Requirements 5.3 weak 
Physical Protection Security Requirements 7.3 strong 
4. Monitored 
Non-repudiation Security Requirements 2.3 weak 
Intrusion Detection Security Requirements 3.0 weak 
System Maintenance Security Requirements 4.0 weak 
Secure Auditing Security Requirements 4.6 weak 
Survivability Security Requirements 4.2 weak 
 
 Based on Table 6.9, organization C was at the initial level because they did not 
achieve standard score for security requirement categories in the basic level. However, 
they had achieved high score in two security requirements categories: the immunity and 
physical protection. One reason they had many low scores due to unspecified format of 
security requirements. They have not provided a clear format and policy how to manage 
security requirements in the software development process although they have high 
concern about security requirements. They might improve their readiness level of SRE 
utilizing the template provided in several security requirements engineering frameworks. 
The evaluation results of the SRERM were shown at Table 6.10, Table 6.11, and 
Table 6.12. The respondent of organization C positively agreed that the form of SRERM 
is clear and easy to learn. He agreed the arrangement of the SRERM structure, including 
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the creation of levels and the distribution of security requirement categories, have no 
confusion or ambiguity. In addition, SRERM can be utilized to effectively measure the 
SRE readiness of software development organizations. He agreed that the SRERM could 
be useful in other organizations. He leaves no suggestion or correction to the SRERM.  
Table 6.10 Ease of Learning Evaluation of Organization C 
Ease of Learning 
Organizations’ perception (n=1) 
Positive Negative Neutral 
SA A % SD D % N % 
SRERM representation is clear 0 1 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
A little knowledge of security 
requirements engineering is required to 
learn how to use SRERM 
1 0 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
It is applicable to learn the practices 
arranged for each security requirements 
component  
0 1 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
It is applicable to learn the assessment 
method 
0 1 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
It is applicable to utilize the SRERM to 
measure organizations readiness for 
security requirements engineering.  
0 1 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
It is applicable to utilize distribution of 
security requirements components 
among various levels, e.g. 
Identification, Authentication, and 
Authorization in Basic Level 
0 1 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
Some trainings should be 
accommodated for the utilization of 
SRERM 
1 0 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 6.11 User Satisfaction Evaluation of Organization C 
User Satisfaction 
Organizations’ perception (n=1) 
Positive Negative Neutral 
SA A % SD D % N % 
SRERM is can be executed to the 
most organizations 
1 0 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
Every practice is obvious to learn and 
clear 
0 1 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
Utilizing the SRERM would 
distinguish strong and weak areas in 
the organizations corresponding to 
the security requirements engineering 
1 0 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
Using the SRERM would improve 
our security requirements 
engineering  
1 0 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
When SRERM were accessible for 
my occupation, I anticipate that I 
would utilize it later on. 
1 0 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
I am fulfilled and approved with the 
readiness issues recognized by 
SRERM. 
1 0 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
It is critical to actualizing SRERM as 
an automated software tool to 
encourage SRE in measuring 
organization’s readiness. 
0 1 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 6.12 SRERM Structure Evaluation of Organization C 
Structure of SRERM 
Organizations’ perception (n=1) 
Positive Negative Neutral 
SA A % SD D % N % 
Every component of the SRERM are 
self-explanatory and require no further 
0 1 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
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clarification to be utilized adequately 
Every component of the SRERM are 
feasible and are suited in security 
requirement engineering process 
0 1 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
The SRERM can be used effectively to 
identify SRE readiness issues with a 
goal of increasing organizations 
readiness for security requirement 
engineering. 
0 1 100% 0 0 0 0 0 
The distribution of security component 
among various readiness levels (e.g. 
identification, authentication, and 
authorization) is valuable 
0 1 100% 0 0 0 0 0 




0 0 0 0 0 
 
6.6 Case Studies Lesson Learned 
There are several lessons we obtained through the case study of SRERM. First, 
we learned how to prepare a well-designed questionnaire. The structure and the design of 
the questionnaire, including the proper description, indirectly contribute to the comfort of 
respondents in completing all sections. It will motivate them to finish the SRERM by 
providing an appropriate answer. In addition, it is essential by respecting the value of our 
respondents’ time. When a questionnaire is not properly designed, the respondent will 
probably need a longer time to finish the SRERM.  
Second, we ascertained a suitable strategy for transferring SRERM knowledge. 
Although the document of the SRERM has been reviewed several times, the respondents 
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may encounter some ambiguities. We provide an introduction to the SRERM for the 
respondents and how to complete before asking them to undertake it. If we ask them look 
directly at the document and to complete it, we probably have to assist them and attend to 
their confusion. 
Third, we identified how to analyze the results of the SRERM. The respondents of 
our case study have differing characteristics, such as the duration of experience, number 
of branches, number of customers and number of the team members. Due to the 
mentioned differences, we carefully extract the information, analyze the reason behind 
the result and propose the summary. 
Lastly, we determined how to improve the SRERM. The feedback from our 
respondents is beneficial for enhancing the usability of the SRERM. We noticed that the 
comments and recommendations from the respondents are essential to ensure the 
applicability of the SRERM in the software organizations.  
6.7 Threat to Validity  
This research has a limitation regarding the outcomes of the conducted SMAPS 
which is utilized for developing the SRERM. When selecting primary studies and 
extracting the data, subjective decisions may occur. A reason for this is that some primary 
studies do not have enough clear description, discussion and contributions. Another 
potential issue is the SMAPS was performed by one individual reviewer. Consequently, 
we mitigated these limitations by utilizing mapping study assistant software, undertaking 
an iterative selection process, and extracting the data comprehensively. 
Another limitation is that this study retrieves publications from five research 
electronic databases only. Some relevant publications may exist in other research 
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electronic databases which are not included in this research. Studies which were 
published since this research was undertaken could have been missed. Nevertheless, we 
believe our outcomes cover the most relevant published literature. 
Realizing this research conducted a case study only on two organizations, it has 
external validity. How the findings can generalize the applicability of the SRERM into 
other organizations will be a challenge. The SRERM was evaluated by two organizations 
which have different characteristics, so generalization of the findings into other 







This study developed a security requirements engineering readiness model 
(SRERM). The purpose of the SRERM is to provide a model which has ability to 
measure the readiness level of SRE activities in software development organizations. The 
organizations are expected to be able to reduce their vulnerabilities in terms of SRE in 
order to produce secure software. 
A systematic mapping study (SMAPS) was an essential part of this research. It 
was comprehensively conducted at the beginning of research. It was purposed to provide 
more information and the current state of SRE. In addition, 104 primary studies were 
analyzed to uncover gaps in the research. Eventually, the security requirement categories 
were utilized in the SRERM development. 
The SRERM has a structure which consists of levels, components, and practices. 
This study presented the SRERM with five levels before conducting a case study, and it 
was changed into four levels after analyzing the respondents’ feedback. Each level 
contains various security components which are referred to security requirement 
categories in the SMAPS. This study utilized the Motorola assessment tool [22] as an 
assessment for each practice in the SRERM. The calculated result for each practice will 
define the level of organization readiness in terms of SRE. 
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In order to assess the usability of the SRERM, case studies were conducted in two 
software organizations. The first is an international organization, which has several 
branches and customers around the world. The second organization is a growing one, 
which provides a support system for a university. Due to the difference in characteristics, 
the results of both case studies were carefully analyzed.  
The outcomes of the case studies and the respondents’ feedback motivated some 
modifications to the SRERM. The changes include moving the security requirements 
component from one level to another level and merging the anticipated level with the 
monitored level. The modified SRERM has been investigated by conducting second case 
studies and we obtained that its feedback is positive. 
7.2 Recommendations 
Considering the trend of software needs is growing, this research offers some 
potential suggestions for future research.  
- To continue this work, the SRERM still needs to generate comprehensive outcomes 
due to different security mechanisms and facilities in various organizations. It needs 
more collaboration with several software development organizations. Some 
organizations which have security third parties or a large number of security experts 
will have a different priority for implementing SRE from the growing organizations.  
- There are various recent technologies such as cloud computing, Internet of Things 
(IoT) and Virtual Reality, which have special characteristics and were not covered in 
this research. However, there is a challenge to find suitable organizations to carry out 
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2. Appendix 2: The Practices of SRERM 
2.1 Identification Security Requirements Practices 
No. Practices 
1. Utilize brainstorming technique to aggregate identification security requirement  
2. Identify system stakeholders to improve identification security requirement 
3. Plan for conflicts and conflict resolution for identification security requirement 
in term of stakeholders  
4. Define standard templates for describing identification security requirement 
5. Use languages simply and concisely to explain identification security 
requirement 
6. Check that identification security requirement meets your standard 
7. Define change management policies for identification security requirement 
 
2.2 Authentication Security Requirements Practices 
No. Practices 
1. Use scenarios to elicit authentication security requirement  
2. Plan for conflicts and conflict resolution for authentication security requirement 
in term of multiple accounts 
3. Define standard templates for describing authentication security requirement 
4. Use languages simply and concisely to explain authentication security 
requirement 
5. Check that authentication security requirement meets your standard 





2.3 Authorization Security Requirements Practices 
No. Practices 
1. Use scenarios to elicit the roles of stakeholders in term of authorization SR 
2. Plan for conflicts and conflict resolution for authorization SR in term of multiple 
roles 
3. Define standard templates for describing authorization SR 
4. Use languages simply and concisely to explain authorization SR 
5. Check that authorization SR meets your standard 
6. Define change management policies for authorization SR 
 
2.4 Immunity Security Requirements Practices 
No. Practices 
1. Define the system's operation environment to gain immunity SR 
2. Assess immunity SR in term of undesirable programs 
3. Define standard templates for describing immunity SR 
4. Use languages simply and concisely to explain immunity SR 
5. Check that immunity SR meets your standard 
6. Define change management policies for immunity SR 
 
2.5 Privacy Security Requirements Practices 
No. Practices 
1. Use scenarios to elicit the sensitive data and communication in term of privacy 
SR 
2. Define the system boundaries in term of privacy SR such as sensitive data and 
communication. 
3. Define standard templates for describing privacy SR 
4. Use languages simply and concisely to explain privacy SR 
5. Check that privacy SR meets your standard 





2.6 Integrity Security Requirements Practices 
No. Practices 
1. Define the operational processes to gain integrity SR 
2. Assess integrity SR risks 
3. Define standard templates for describing integrity SR 
4. Use languages simply and concisely to explain integrity SR 
5. Check that integrity SR meets your standard 
6. Define change management policies for integrity SR 
 
2.7 Physical Protection Security Requirements Practices 
No. Practices 
1. Be sensitive to organizational and political consideration in gaining physical 
protection of SR 
2. Assess physical protection SR risks 
3. Define standard templates for describing physical protection SR 
4. Use languages simply and concisely to explain physical protection SR 
5. Check that physical protection SR meets your standard 
6. Define change management policies for physical protection SR 
 
2.8 Non-repudiation Security Requirements Practices 
No. Practices 
1. Define operational processes to gain non-repudiation SR 
2. Plan for conflicts and conflict resolution in term of non-repudiation SR 
3. Define standard templates for describing non-repudiation SR 
4. Use languages simply and concisely to explain non-repudiation SR 
5. Check that non-repudiation SR meets your standard 





2.9 Intrusion Detection Security Requirements Practices 
No. Practices 
1. Define operational processes to gain intrusion detection SR 
2. Use interaction matrices to find conflicts and overlaps in term of intrusion 
detection SR 
3. Define standard templates for describing intrusion detection SR 
4. Use languages simply and concisely to explain intrusion detection SR 
5. Check that intrusion detection SR meets your standard 
6. Define change management policies for intrusion detection SR 
 
2.10 System Maintenance Security Requirements Practices 
No. Practices 
1. Use scenarios to elicit system maintenance SR 
2. Define system boundaries in term of system maintenance SR 
3. Define standard templates for describing system maintenance SR 
4. Use languages simply and concisely to explain system maintenance SR 
5. Check that system maintenance SR meets your standard 
6. Define change management policies for system maintenance SR 
 
2.11 Secure Auditing Security Requirements Practices 
No. Practices 
1. Define operational processes in order to gain secure auditing SR 
2. Use checklists for secure auditing SR 
3. Assess security requirement risks to support secure auditing SR 
4. Define standard templates for describing secure auditing SR 
5. Use languages simply and concisely to explain secure auditing SR 
6. Check that secure auditing SR meets your standard 





2.12 Survivability Security Requirements Practices 
No. Practices 
1. Define the system's operation environment to gain survivability SR 
2. Assess system feasibility in term of survivability SR 
3. Plan for conflicts and conflict resolution in term of survivability SR 
4. Assess survivability SR risk 
5. Define standard templates for describing survivability SR 
6. Use languages simply and concisely to explain survivability SR 
7. Check that survivability SR meets your standard 
8. Define change management policies for survivability SR 
 
3. Appendix 3: Case Study Feedback form 




High Neutral Low 
Very 
Low 
How do you rate your knowledge security 
requirement engineering? 
     
How do you rate your practical experience 
of security requirement engineering? 
     
 
 










SRERM representation is very 
clear 
     
2. 
A little knowledge of security 
requirement engineering is 
required to learn how to use 
SRERM 
     
3. 
It is easy to understand the 
practices designed for each 
security requirement component  
     
4. 
It is easy to understand the 
assessment method 
     
5. 
It is easy to use the SRERM to 
assess organizations readiness 
for security requirement 





It is easy to use distribution of 
security requirement among 
different levels, e.g. 
Identification, Authentication, 
and Authorization in Initial 
Level 
     
7. 
Some training needs to be 
provided for the use of SRERM 
     
 
8. 
How confident are you in 
the ratings that you have 









     
 
 










SRERM is general and can be 
applied to most companies 
     
10. 
Each individual practice is 
easy to understand and 
unambiguous 
     
11. 
Using the SRERM would 
identify strong and weak areas 
in the company regarding 
security requirement 
engineering 
     
12. 
Using the SRERM would 
improve our security 
requirement engineering  
     
13. 
If the SRERM were available 
for my job, I predict that I 
would use it on regular basis 
in the future. 
     
14. 
I am satisfied and agreed with 
the readiness issues identified 
by SRERM. 
     
15. 
It is important to implement 
SRERM in the form of an 
automated software tool to 
facilitate security requirement 
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engineering in assessing 
organization’s readiness. 
16. The SRERM is self-contained      
17. 
The SRERM is a useful 
readiness tool for security 
requirement engineering. 
     
18. 
The assessment method is 
useful. 
     
 
19. 
How confident are you in 
the ratings that you have 









     
 










All the components of the 
SRERM are self-explanatory 
and require no further 
explanation to be used 
effectively 
     
21. 
The components of the SRERM 
are practical and are applicable 
in security requirement 
engineering process 
     
22. 
The SRERM can be used 
effectively to identify security 
requirement engineering 
readiness issues with a goal of 
increasing organizations 
readiness for security 
requirement engineering. 
     
23. 
The distribution of security 
component among different 
readiness levels (e.g. 
identification, authentication, 
and authorization) is useful 
 




The 4 readiness levels of 
SRERM are useful 
     
 
25. 
How confident are you in 
the ratings that you have 









     
 
26. Are there any modifications or improvements to the SRERM that you may suggest? 
27. Are there any components that you may suggest adding to the SRERM in the future, 
please also give the reasons? 
28. Please provide any comments relating to the assessment method. 
29. Please provide any comments relating to the distribution of practices across various 
security requirement practices. 
30. Please provide any comments relating to the usability of SRERM with respect to time 
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